Fatah (the party of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas) and Hamas (the Islamist group in control of the Gaza Strip) announced an agreement to form a Palestinian national unity government within five weeks. The deal also includes calling presidential and parliamentary elections within six months. This could put an end to the existing division of the Palestinian territories since 2007, when Hamas and Fatah clashed violently, which resulted in the West Bank being left under the control of the Palestinian Authority (Fatah majority), while Gaza remained under Hamas rule.

The Israeli government has immediately reacted by cancelling a meeting with Palestinian negotiators, with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu saying that Fatah cannot make peace with Israel if it also makes deals with Hamas.

In order to understand the context that has led to the Fatah-Hamas deal, Nationalia has spoken to Lurdes Vidal, Head of Arab Mediterranean World Department in Barcelona-based European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed). Four key elements are selected:

1. Geopolitical change

Vidal says that recent geopolitical changes in the region are a key factor to understand the agreement: "After the Arab Spring, Hamas split from its traditional allies: Hezbollah, Syria and Iran. Qatar -the largest sponsor of the Arab world after the Arab Spring- immediately replacemed Hamas's traditional allies. But recently Qatar has also experienced a decline in its process of regional outreach: the emir has been succeeded by his son, and Qatar's soft power has been reduced". Amid this context, Hamas was left only with support from the Muslim Brotherhood's Egypt, with former President Mohamed Mursi at the helm: "Egypt gave Hamas guarantees of minimum survival through the Sinai border". Through Gaza-Egypt tunnels, not only people, but also goods, food, bulding materials and weapons were smuggled. But after Mursi's overthrow, the new government of Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has made a U-turn, has closed the border with Gaza, and has even blown up several tunnels: the situation in Gaza has now become even more desperate than it used to be, and Hamas has been virtually left with no viable exit.

2. Non far-reaching negotiations

"Since 2000", what Israelis and Palestinians have been doing "is negotiating for the sake of negotiating, negotiating on the terms of negotiation... but nothing has been negotiated on real, which would have been desirable", Vidal says. The current round of negotiations has been, above all, an initiative of American Secretary of State John Kerry, "who has taken this as a personal mission and cause". But negotiation requires willingness from all parties in order to reach agreements. "As months went by, the atmosphere deteriorated. Israel refused to release the last contingent of Palestinian prisoners, and introduced a new package of settlement building. Those have been unilateral decisions by Israel, aside from Kerry's attempts". Unilateral decisions have also been taken by the Palestinians: "It has been a tug-of-war on both sides", which has culminated in the Hamas-Fatah agreement, which has provided Israel with an excuse to say that the negotiations are over. But "the Palestinians also had given up the current negotiations practically for lost. Anyway, reconciliation is good news for the Palestinians".

3. Seeking a Palestinian leadership with new legitimacy

So that negotiators from either side have strength when sitting on the negotiating table, and for decisions taken to be implemented on the ground, "leaderships need a high level of legitimacy", Vidal says. But "Mahmoud Abbas is now a leader with little legitimacy, who could only negotiate on behalf of Fatah and the West Bank, but not on behalf of Gaza or Hamas". Thus, Abbas "needs to re-legitimize not only his own leadership, but also the very Palestinian National Authority. A transparent electoral process, like the one held in 2006, would bring more legitimacy to the Palestinian leadership", and it could eventually lead to the reunification of Palestine, currently divided between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In this sense, thus, it is not only Hamas who was in need of a way out from its physical blockade in Gaza, but also Fatah needed to escape from its own blocakde.

4. Choosing Hamas instead of peace... or instead of a dead end

The argument by Netanyahu is that, by choosing Hamas as a partner, Fatah cannot make peace with Israel. However, the conditions under which Netanyahu is working in Israel proper must also be considered: "A part of the Israeli government is very hostile to any agreement with the Palestinians", Vidal highlights. Among the parties opposing any kind of agreement are Yisrael Beitenu and The Jewish Home, but also "all the settlers' movement, which is increasingly receiving more and more support within Israeli society". The settlers' movement opposes agreements with the Palestinians, and is especially reluctant to any land swap that could pave the way to a peace deal: "It is a taboo for them". Under those conditions, it is difficult for the current Israeli government to move on towards any substantial agreement.

(Image: Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas on the left, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal on the right / Meshaal picture by Trango.)