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The Karabakh conflict: key elements in the current escalation
Dozens killed in worst combats since 1994 · Tensions have increased in recent years along rising military spending · Domestic factors help explain why
A self-proclaimed, non-recognized republic. Ethnic Armenian-majority Nagorno-Karabakh was integrated into Azerbaijan over the Soviet period. In the 1980s, Karabakh Armenians demonstrated demanding the union of the territory with Armenia. Moscow did not accept the demand, and Nagorno Karabakh declared itself independent from Azerbaijan as the Soviet Union broke up. Its independence has been recognized by no one, not even Armenia.
Frozen since 1994, but not that much. Karabakh Armenian forces, backed by the army of the Republic of Armenia, waged a war of independence against Azerbaijan from 1992 to 1994. The conflict ended with Armenian victory, and a ceasefire was declared. The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh annexed some Azerbaijani territories captured over the war, allowing it to gain territorial continuity with Armenia. Ever since, the conflict has been considered as frozen, given the fact that a no-peace, no-war statu quo has been preserved over the two decades. Still, sporadic violent incidents on the line of demarcation have erupted time and again.
Increasing militarization. Armenia and Azerbaijan has been immersed into a growing arms race since the conflict came frozen. In 1995, Armenia allocated 52 million dollars (at today's prices) to military expenditure, while Azerbaijan spent 66 million dollars. In 2015 the figures had risen to 447 million in the case of Armenia and 3,021 million in the case of Azerbaijan, according to SIPRI data. This means that military spending rose from 4.1% of GDP in 1995 to 4.5% now in the case of Armenia. In Azerbaijan, the leap was much more significant: from 2.7% in 1995 to 4.6% in 2015, taking advantage of the country's growing health thanks to oil exports.
Recent escalation. The analysis of what has been happening in the last two years allows us to conclude that these days' outbreak of violence is not an isolated incident. In this article published early this year in Nationalia, Sandra Veloy writes that 60 people had been killed in the frontline in 2014, while "2015 saw an unprecedented level of violence, including the use of artillery by both sides in September, which was for the first time since the ceasefire in 1994."
Domestic dynamics. In two countries engulfed with economic, political and social problems, "the war has become the single most valuable and abundant source of fuel for each regimes’ propaganda machine," analyst Ryan McCarrel writes. "The constant media barrage is meant to create a sense of national duty and patriotism, while deflecting attention from the issues that matter most to daily life - lack of access to good jobs, basic services, and a deteriorating economic situation that is going to get worse before it gets better."
Russia-Turkey tensions: not-so-central issue. A recurring explanation for the current outbreak of violence is that it is an expression of tensions between Russia and Turkey, mainly arising from the war in Syria. It is true that, in general terms, Armenia aligns itself with Moscow – the Russians have their own military base in Armenia, and both countries are CSTO -a mutual defence agreement- members. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan tends to find support and understanding from Ankara. But it is also true that "Baku has recently turned increasingly to Moscow to strengthen its military position: over the last five years, 85 per cent of Azerbaijan’s arms imports have come from Russia," Crisis Group's Europe and Central Asia program director Magdalena Grono writes. "The number of Azerbaijani actors whose strategic calculations are aligning more with Russia have increased - both because of their waning conviction that the West or Turkey could prevail in a showdown with Russia, and due to personal economic interests."
Carnegie Endowment expert Thomas de Waal likewise says that "it is a mistake to think that Moscow is the primary actor. I think Armenia and Azerbaijan are the primary actors in this conflict. And Moscow is a strong secondary actor, but it is not manipulating everything." "Both the Armenian and Azerbaijani militaries," De Waal continues, "are very strongly independent. They don't like to be pushed around by Moscow."